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Workplace Democracy in the Lab
* 
 
While intuition suggests that empowering workers to have some say in the control of the firm 
is likely to have beneficial incentive effects, empirical evidence of such an effect is hard to 
come by because of numerous confounding factors in the naturally occurring data. We report 
evidence from a real-effort experiment confirming that worker performance is sensitive to the 
process used to select the compensation contract. Groups of workers that voted to determine 
their compensation scheme provided significantly more effort than groups that had no say in 
how they would be compensated. This effect is robust to controls for the compensation 
scheme implemented and worker characteristics (i.e., ability and gender). 
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* Funding for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation (SBE 0752822). 1 Introduction
There is a rich history of debate in the economics literature about which members of an orga-
nization should make the important decisions. The most common model of ﬁrm governance,
for example, employs a centralized decision-making authority, but participatory models that
delegate decision-making responsibilities to workers can be regularly observed. For example,
Kruse et al. (2008) ﬁnd that up to 40% of employees in the U.S. report having a lot of
inﬂuence on ﬁrm decisions or say that they often participate with other workers in job deci-
sions. Historically, the push for “employee empowerment initiatives” and similar programs
have often been seen as responding to general concerns of fairness, job satisfaction, work-
place trust, and perhaps most importantly for economists, as promoting the productivity of
workers (e.g. Freeman et al., 2007, Dow, 2003).
While scores of studies have sought to compare how diﬀerent ﬁrm-governance structures
aﬀect the motivation and performance of workers, it is an issue that has proven diﬃcult to
resolve (Levin and Tyson, 1990). We speculate that much of the ambiguity in the empirical
literature may be due to the diﬃculty of controlling for confounding factors such as dis-
tinct production technologies, market conditions, monitoring structures, and compensation
methods that complicate the identiﬁcation of worker performance. Another hurdle is how
to control for innate employee ability when evaluating how a policy or governance structure
aﬀects worker performance. Self-reports, attitudinal surveys, IQ tests, years of education,
quality of education, resume quality, years of job experience, and subjective managerial
evaluations have been used in many labor studies to approximate unobservable worker char-
acteristics like skill and intrinsic motivation. These proxy measures can be noisy and this
may also contribute to the mixed ﬁndings in this literature.
As suggested by Falk and Fehr (2003) and Berg (2006) we mitigate many of the con-
founding issues inherent to labor market studies by using a controlled laboratory experiment.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether the performance of workers is sensitive to the provision
of decision-control rights over a meaningful decision — the determination of the workers’
compensation scheme.
Like van Dijk et al. (2001) and Freeman and Gelber (2010), we collected data from a
real-eﬀort experiment; however, we focus on changes in the performance of our participants
when the compensation scheme is implemented either endogenously by the workers using
a simple majority vote or by a random process completely exogenous to the group. While
there are a number of more complicated voting rules that could be implemented, our decision
to employ the plurality rule (simple majority) was informed by Frey (1983) who concludes
that the best known and most widely used is majority rule.
1By design, we control for all issues that pertain to monitoring, punishment, threats,
or other forms of coercion that might also accompany many types of systems of control
in real-world ﬁrms. We further strip down the eﬀort task so that it is not reliant on team
production to minimize confounds that could arise in social dilemmas (e.g., trust, reciprocity
or reputation) and restrict the menu of potential compensation schemes, to two where all
claims on residual proﬁts are held by labor. Our real-eﬀort task additionally allows us to
collect measures of both eﬀort (trying hard) and eﬀective eﬀort (quality of work).
We use a 2 (decision-control rights regimes) by 2 (incentive contracts) between-subjects
design to compare performance under diﬀerent decision-control rights treatments. All sub-
jects in each session participated in three periods. In the ﬁrst, practice, period, participants
were paid a ﬁxed sum to spend 5 minutes familiarizing themselves with the eﬀort task - solv-
ing simple addition problems. In period two, participants were randomly and anonymously
assigned to groups of three, and told that they would again solve problems for 5 minutes, but
that the method by which they would be compensated for their performance was contingent
upon the implementation of one of two possible incentive contracts — either a rank-order tour-
nament or a group revenue-sharing contract. Depending on the treatment, the decision over
which compensation scheme would be implemented was made either endogenously by vote
where all three group members had equitable decision-control rights (the Voting treatment)
or exogenously by the computer (the Control treatment). The third period was identical
to the ﬁrst in that participants were again paid a ﬁxed sum to solve addition problems for
another 5 minutes. We included the third period, by which time the participants were surely
comfortable with the task, to measure their ability.
We report evidence suggesting that eﬀort in our experiment is sensitive to the decision-
control rights arrangement used to select the compensation contract. Consistent with intu-
ition, allowing groups of workers to participate in determining the compensation scheme for
their group increases eﬀort signiﬁcantly. While this may not be surprising, ours is the ﬁrst
study to conﬁrm this intuition for group level decisions. Further, these eﬀects persist even
after controlling for gender, compensation scheme, and ability.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted ﬁfteen 45-minute sessions over a three-week period with 180 participants who
earned an average of $14, including a $5 show-up payment. Upon arriving participants signed
a consent form and were seated at a computer terminal where they found a sheet introducing
the study to them and a copy of instructions for the practice period.1
1A copy of the instructions appears as in the appendix.
2In the practice period participants were paid a ﬁxed wage of 75 Experimental Monetary
Units (30EMUs = 1USD) for adding diﬀerent sets of ﬁve two-digit numbers that appeared
on their computer screen. Participants were not allowed to use a calculator, but could use
scratch paper and a pencil. The numbers to be added together were randomly generated,
but everyone received the same set of math problems, in the same order. We chose to use
this task because we expected that adding yields low intrinsic reward, it requires little skill,
especially for a college student, and most importantly, previous work has found that it does
not result in biased performance in any systematic manner (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).2
When the 5 minutes of practice were over, participants saw a screen that displayed how many
problems they correctly solved as well as a reminder of their earnings for the period.
At the beginning of period two participants were informed that they had randomly and
anonymously been assigned to groups of three. The instructions indicated that one of two
possible compensation schemes would be implemented and that the scheme would aﬀect
the payout of the entire group. The compensation schemes were simple incentive contracts.
In both cases the pool of earnings to be distributed among the members of the group was
determined by paying 10EMUs for each correct answer generated by the group. The schemes
diﬀered only in how the total proceeds were distributed back to the group members. Under
the tournament scheme the person with the highest number of correct answers received 60%
of the earnings, the second highest performer received 30%, and the lowest performer received
the residual 10%.3 All ties were broken at random. Under the revenue-sharing scheme the
total proceeds were simply divided equally among the group members.
The instructions also described how the decision to implement a compensation scheme
would be made. In each session only one treatment (i.e., one decision-making process) was
implemented. Subjects had no prior knowledge of which treatments would be run in a
given session. In the Voting treatment the decision to implement the tournament or the
revenue-sharing contract was made by a simple majority vote and in the Control treatment
all members in the group were informed that the implementation of either the tournament
or the revenue sharing contract would be done randomly by the computer program (similar
to what was done in the related prisoner’s dilemma study of Dal Bó et al., 2010).
2The experiment was coded in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). We gratefully acknowledge the authors of
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) for sharing their code for the adding production task.
3Considerable thought was put into the incentives of the tournament. In fact, we ran pilot experiments to
collect participant preferences over the two compensation schemes as we titrated the relative payoﬀs because
we wanted to make sure that both contracts would be chosen with some regularity. We decided on the
60|30|10 distribution because it created a tournament that made the average participant in the pilot nearly
indiﬀerent between the two schemes. We took the further precaution of ﬁrst collecting the voting data and
then calibrated the randomization procedure in the control to match the frequency of the compensation
scheme selection. Table 1 shows that these precautions, in addition to a fair amount of luck, were very
successful in generating the same frequency of compensation schemes across treatments.
3Before the 5-minute period of solving math problems began in period two all subjects
were informed of the outcome from the decision-making process regarding how they would be
compensated. At the end of the 5-minute period, all subjects were presented with a screen
indicating how many correct answers they provided, the group total of correct answers, their
individual payoﬀ, and their relative rank within their group of three. At this point, all
subjects received a set of instructions for period three of the experiment which was identical
to the practice period in that participants were paid another 75EMUs to solve problems for
5 minutes.
After period three a brief survey was administered that asked for a few characteristics
that have proven to be important in this context. As one can see in Table 1, overall 28% of
the participants reported that math came relatively easy to them and 51% of our participants
were male. When all subjects were ﬁnished with the survey, they were individually called to
the back of the room by identiﬁcation number, where they received their payments in sealed
envelopes.
3 Does voting increase eﬀort?
In Figure 1 we compare mean levels of eﬀort (i.e., the number of math problems attempted in
period two) and eﬀective eﬀort (i.e., the number correct) between the two treatments. As one
can see, voting increases both; however, the raw diﬀerences are only marginally signiﬁcant.4
If we look at Table 1 we can begin to posit why the raw eﬀect of voting is not as
pronounced as one might expect. To begin we see that fewer of the participants in the
voting treatment indicated an ease with math. In addition, note that Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) found that men tend to do slightly better in this task and there were more men in
the control.
In Table 2 we correct our estimates for these diﬀerences. In column (1) we see that after
controlling for math ease, participants in the voting treatment increase eﬀort by just shy of
one unit (p<0.05). In column (2) we conﬁrm that men provide higher eﬀort (p<0.05) and,
consistent with van Dijk et al. (2001), we also see that eﬀort is higher in the tournaments
(p<0.01). Most importantly, in column (2) we see that controlling for math ease, gender,
and the compensation scheme increases the point estimate on the eﬀect of voting (and its
signiﬁcance). Recall that we ran period three to gather a measure of ability. When we
include the total attempted in the third period in column (3), we see that this measure
of ability soaks up some of the variation previously attributed to voting (notice the slight
4Under the hypothesis that voting should increase eﬀort we ﬁnd, using simple t-tests, p=0.06 for eﬀort
and p=0.09 for eﬀective eﬀort.
4treatment diﬀerences seen in Table 1) but the estimate remains substantial and signiﬁcant
at better than the 5% level.5 Lastly, in column (4) we switch focus to the number of correct
answers in period two and ﬁnd almost identical results — voting signiﬁcantly increases both
eﬀort and eﬀective eﬀort.6
4 Concluding remarks
We show that providing workers with “voice” in how they will be compensated increases their
eﬀort signiﬁcantly and the eﬀects are not small. Indeed, there are a number of elements that
likely dampen the eﬀects that we have found. Because participants are frequently intrinsically
motivated to work hard in real-eﬀort environments (often regardless of the rules), treatment
eﬀects tend to be muted. In addition, recall that our participants worked only for a short
while. Despite the dampening elements of our design, we still estimate that output increased
by approximately one unit which compared to the mean constitutes an increase in eﬀort of
7% and an increase in eﬀective eﬀort of 9%.
By showing that the process by which a material incentive was implemented partially
explains diﬀerences in performance, we add further credence to recent claims that procedural
aspects cannot be separated from how individuals interpret material incentives (e.g. Frey
et al., 2004 or Dal Bó et al., 2010). Obviously, this experiment is only a start and there
are a number of interesting possible extensions. For example, we plan to next examine
what happens when another layer of realism is added back — instead of comparing voting to
random assignment, what if the alternative is a regime in which decision control rights are
centralized in an “authority” who picks the compensation scheme unilaterally?
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66 Tables and Figure
Table 1: Participant Observables by Treatment.
Overall Control Voting
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Math ease (I) 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.23 0.42
Male (I) 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.50
Tournament (I) 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.61 0.49
Attempted in piece rate period 13.44 3.91 13.36 4.00 13.52 3.85































Effort Effective Effort 90% C.I.
Figure 1: Voting increases eﬀort.
7Table 2: Eﬀort Diﬀerence Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀective
Eﬀort
Voting Treatment (I) 0.946** 1.074** 0.809** 0.810*
(0.477) (0.477) (0.365) (0.430)
Male (I) 1.071** 0.427 0.291
(0.469) (0.362) (0.426)




Constant 13.813*** 12.357*** 6.277*** 3.521***
(0.323) (0.529) (1.021) (0.980)
Observations 180 180 180 180
R2 0.058 0.133 0.483 0.419
Self-reports of the “ease of math” included; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
87 Appendix - Experiment instructions
Introduction (Common for all Treatments)
Thank you for participating in our study today. You will earn $5 just for showing up on
time and during the experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn more money. The
amount of money that you will get paid depends on your actions, as well as the actions of
others in this experiment session. The monetary unit that is used throughout the duration
of this experiment is an ’experimental monetary unit,’ (EMU). At the conclusion of the
experiment, all EMUs that you have accumulated will be converted into dollars at the rate
of 30 EMUs = $1.00. You will be paid in cash today, at the end of the experiment. The
money to conduct this study has been provided by the National Science Foundation. Please
note that any and all actions and decisions that you make in the exercises or responses you
provide are strictly conﬁdential and anonymous. We intend to use the data collected from
our study for academic work as it relates to group organization. To assure your responses
are conﬁdential, we ask you to not speak to each other until the entire study is completed.
A lab assistant will read all subsequent instructions aloud to you. Please read along
with the lab assistant as s/he read them to you. If you have any questions while these
instructions are being read, please raise your hand and we will attempt to answer them. You
are not allowed to communicate with other participants during the experiment, even to clarify
instructions. Again, if you have any questions, please raise your hand and a lab assistant
will assist you. This experiment will have 4 diﬀerent parts; Period 1, Period 2, Period 3, and
a brief survey. At the end of the experiment session, we will call you individually by number
to give you your earnings in cash.
Instructions for Period 1 (Common for all Treatments)
In this experiment you will be completing a production task that consists of adding up
sets of ﬁve 2-digit numbers. The use of a calculator is prohibited, but you may use scratch
paper and pencil provided to you on your desk. The numbers that you will be adding
together are randomly drawn and each problem is presented in the following way:
9After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem to solve.
The production task of solving addition problems in Period 1 will last for 5 minutes. At the
end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of how many problems you correctly
solved as well as your payment for Period 1.
Your compensation for solving problems in Period 1 will be a ﬁxed payment of = 75
EMUs. At the end of Period 1, we will hand out a new set of instructions for Period 2.
Period 2 Instructions (Opening Paragraph for Treatment 1: Voting)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2 other people
(3 total). Group members are connected through the computer network in this room and
your identities will remain anonymous throughout the remainder of the experiment. At the
beginning of Period 2 you will receive a message that indicates that you and the other two
group members will democratically decide how all group members will be compensated for
correctly adding up diﬀerent sets of 2-digit numbers. The democratic process by which your
group will reach a decision is through a simple voting election. You will each vote for one
of the following two compensation schemes which will aﬀect the way all three persons in the
group are compensated.
The compensation scheme that receives a majority of votes will be implemented.
Period 2 Instructions (Opening paragraph for Treatment 2: Control)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2 other people
(3 total). Group members are connected through the computer network in this room and
10your identities will remain anonymous throughout the remainder of the experiment. Once
you are in a group, a message will be sent to all three members that indicates how the
members of your group will be compensated for correctly adding up diﬀerent sets of 2-digit
numbers. The computer will randomly choose between 1 of the following 2 compensation
schemes which will aﬀect the way all three persons in the group are compensated.
The computer will randomly assign either compensation scheme 1 or compensation scheme
2.
[The following are common instructions for all treatments]
Compensation scheme 1 (CS1): If CS1 is chosen, then all of the correct answers
from all members in the group are summed together. Each correct answer from the group is
worth 10EMUs. Under CS1, the person who has the highest number of contributions to the
group total will receive 60% of all of the proceeds, the second highest performer will receive
30% of the proceeds, and the third highest performer will receive 10% of the proceeds.
For example: Let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems correctly, Subject
2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
Subject 1: 5 correct answers
Subject 2: 10 correct answers
Subject 3: 15 correct answers
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers
30 correct answers × 10EMUs = 300EMUs (Total Proceeds)
In this example, the payments for each subject in the group under CS1 are as follows:
Subject 1 would receive: 300EMUs × (.10) = 30EMUs (5 Correct), Subject 2 would receive:
300EMUs × (.30) = 90EMUs (10 Correct) and Subject 3 would receive: 300EMUs × (.60)
= 180EMUs (15 Correct-Highest performer).
Tiebreaker rule: It is possible that that 2 or more subjects have solved the exact same
number of addition problems correctly. Regardless of whether there is a 2-way, or 3-way tie,
ALL TIES ARE BROKEN AT RANDOM BY THE COMPUTER PROGRAM.
An example of a tie between highest and second highest contributions: Let us assume
that Subject 1 solves 4 problems, both Subjects 2 and 3 solve 7 problems each.
Subject 1: 4 correct answers
Subject 2: 7 correct answers
Subject 3: 7 correct answers
114 + 7 + 7 = 18 total correct answers
18 correct answers × 10EMUs = 180EMUs (Total Proceeds)
In this example, Subject’s 2 and 3 have each produced the same total of correct answers
(each with 7 correct). If there is a tie under CS1, the tie is broken randomly by the computer
program.
In this example, under CS1: Subject 1 would receive with certainty: 180EMUs × (.10)
= 18 EMUs. Subject 2 and Subject 3 could either receive: 180EMUs × (.60) = 108 EMUs
(Depending on tie-break outcome) or 180EMUs × (.30) = 54 EMUs.
Compensation scheme 2 (CS2): If CS2 is chosen, all of the correct answers from all
members in the group are summed together. Each correct answer from the group is worth
10EMUs. Under CS2, every subject in the group will receive the same share of the total
earned by the group.
For example: Again, let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems correctly,
Subject 2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
Subject 1: 5 correct answers
Subject 2: 10 correct answers
Subject 3: 15 correct answers
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers
30 correct answers × 10EMUs = 300EMUs (Total Proceeds)
Under CS2, all subjects receive the same share of the group total. In this example, the
group total is 300EMUs, therefore the payoﬀ to each member is 300EMUs/3 group members
= 100EMUs per subject.
Payoﬀs in this example (CS2): Subject 1 receives 100 EMUs (5 Correct answers), Subject
2 receives 100 EMUs (10 Correct answers) and Subject 3 receives 100 EMUs (15 Correct
answers).
Period 3 Instructions (Common for all Treatments)
In Period 3, you will again be presented with the same production task that consists of
adding up sets of ﬁve 2-digit numbers. The use of a calculator is prohibited, but may use
scratch paper and pencil provided to you on your desk.
After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem to solve.
The production task of solving addition problems in Period 3 will last for 5 minutes. At the
end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of how many problems you correctly
solved as well as your payment for Period 3.
Your compensation for solving problems in Period 3 will be a ﬁxed payment of 75 EMU.
12